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THIS CHANGES EVERYTHING: A CALL FOR A
DIRECTIVE, GOAL-ORIENTED PRINCIPLE TO
GUIDE THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION BY
FEDERAL PROSECUTORS
Mark Osler*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Power Games and Sentencing Law
In the past few years, nowhere has power shifted so quickly and so
violently within the Federal Courts as it has in the realm of sentencing.1
In 2003, Congress flexed its muscles, took power from judges, and
reapportioned it to prosecutors through the Feeney Amendment.2 Then,
in January 2005, the Supreme Court dramatically ruled in United States v.
Booker3 that the federal sentencing guidelines could no longer be
mandatory, thus jerking discretion away from prosecutors and giving it
back to judges.4 Now, some in Congress seem poised once again to take
charge and shift power to prosecutors yet again.5 This epic battle
between the judicial and legislative branches of government over the
power accorded to the administrative branch (in the person of the
Associate Professor of Law, Baylor Law School, J.D. Yale Law School, B.A., William
and Mary. The author would like to thank Charles Brancaccio, who provided research
assistance for this project, and Professor Steven Chanenson of the Villanova University
School of Law, who provided a number of important insights and ideas after viewing an
early draft of this article.
1
Shifts in power are inevitable, of course, where three branches of government compete
for power. Kyron Huigens, What Is and Is Not Pathological in Criminal Law, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 811, 812 (2002).
2
See Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today
(“PROTECT Act”) of 2003 Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 650 (2003). For a good
discussion of the way the Feeney Act achieved this, see David M. Zlotnick, The War Within
the War on Crime: The Congressional Assault on Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. REV.
211 (2004). It accomplished this shift by new rules, such as the rule requiring that the
prosecutor file a motion if the defendant is to get the full measure of credit for “acceptance
of responsibility” and pleading guilty. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b)
(2002).
3
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
4
Id. at 756.
5
Significantly, this includes Representative Tom Feeney of Florida, author of the
Feeney Amendment, who on the day of the Booker decision announced that “[t]he Supreme
Court’s decision to place this extraordinary power to sentence a person solely in the hands
of a single federal judge—who is accountable to no one—flies in the face of the clear will of
Congress.” Press Release, Tom Feeney, Feeney Comments on Supreme Court Sentencing
Ruling (Jan. 12, 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/fl24_feeney/
SupremeCourtOpinion.html.
*
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prosecutor) is far from finished. To key players like Justice Breyer, this
fluctuation may feel somewhat like playing tennis,6 but to criminal
practitioners it may be more akin to being the scuffed-up yellow ball
being whacked from baseline to baseline.7
B. The Constant of Prosecutorial Discretion
Regardless of where we are in this battle, one constant remains:
Even given these sudden shifts, federal prosecutors today still wield
tremendous discretion, even if it is less than that accorded to judges (for
the moment).8 Though they may not have the same ability post-Booker to
leverage mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, prosecutors retain the power
to guide investigations, accept or decline cases, draft charges, press for
convictions through plea negotiation, and seek specific sentences.9
Beneath this continuing truth lies a crucial question: What
guides federal prosecutors in exercising this discretion? One would
think there would be an easy answer, a directive, goal-oriented principle
that would consistently guide those important choices.10 There is not.11
Rather, discretion is exercised in an inconsistent manner by local U.S.
Attorneys and Assistant U.S. Attorneys, who each employ their own
distinctive and personal set of guiding principles.12 For all that the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) does, in the end it fails to direct any kind
of principled, consistent exercise of discretion by hundreds of federal
prosecutors. Instead, those prosecutors revolve in their own orbits of
6
In Booker, Justice Breyer used the tennis analogy in concluding that “[o]urs, of course,
is not the last word: The ball now lies in Congress’ court.” Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 768.
7
Both prosecutors and defense attorneys face the challenge of keeping pace with
changing law. However, it may be more of a challenge for defense attorneys who maintain
federal criminal practice as only a fraction of their work, compared to the prosecutor who
does all of her work in federal court.
8
Some, I suspect, would say that prosecutors, even after Booker, have more power than
judges. William J. Stuntz of Harvard has persuasively argued that the tremendous breadth
of a prosecutor’s discretion is taken largely from the legislature, not judges, and is largely
built on a pathological overcriminalization via the expansion of the federal penal code. See
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001). He
believes that “[a]s criminal law expands, both lawmaking and adjudication pass into the
hands of police and prosecutors; law enforcers, not the law, determine who goes to prison
and for how long.” Id at 509.
9
See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 395-423 (1992)
(discussing the powers of prosecutors prior to Booker).
10
I describe this guiding directive as a principle because that word seems the truest fit.
The dictionary defines a “principle” as “a comprehensive and fundamental law, doctrine or
assumption.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 987 (11th ed. 2004).
11
See infra Part III.
12
See infra Part III.
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personal morality, a constellation of independent stars and galaxies each
with their own hue of light.13
This article calls for a change. Specifically, it asks the Attorney
General to articulate a directive, goal-oriented principle that would allow
for the consistent and principled exercise of discretion and a true moral
voice for the DOJ.
C. Discretion in the Real World
A young Assistant U.S. Attorney in a large city sits in a conference
room with several agents of the local narcotics task force. The task force
is presenting a case investigation, involving a conspiracy that is shipping
cocaine into the city and distributing it. The agents have identified the
following three levels of involvement: the leader of the organization, who
directs the actions of others and retains the majority of the profits; three
managers who subdivide bulk shipments and handle cash; and six dealers
who sell the cocaine locally. The agents are ready to turn the case over
for indictment or to continue the investigation without a charge. Either
way, it would be helpful in making the case if some of the defendants
would offer information and testimony against the others.
Over the course of this case, the prosecutor will wield tremendous
discretion at every stage. Starting from the meeting with the agents and
moving forward chronologically, the prosecutor will make key
discretionary decisions not only in directing the investigation but also in
accepting or declining the case for prosecution,14 choosing what charge
to lodge against each defendant,15 crafting plea agreements,16 and
making sentencing recommendations to the court.17 At each stage, as
part of these decisions, she will also have to evaluate which defendants

13
To complete the analogy, Assistant U.S. Attorneys acting on their own would be stars,
and groups of them clustered together under a U.S. Attorney would be a galaxy.
14
Some commentators see this as an especially important area of prosecutorial
discretion, as it is wholly unreviewable and not subjected to “rigorous checks and
balances” found in other areas of the prosecutor’s work. Michael Edmund O’Neill, When
Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221,
222-23 (2003).
15
The power to charge is now so fully in the prosecutor’s hands that the Grand Jury
may not issue an indictment without the signature of the prosecutor. FED. R. CRIM. P.
7(c)(1).
16
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1).
17
Some sentencing choices, such as whether to adjust the sentence for cooperation after
the initial sentencing, can only be addressed upon the motion of the prosecutor. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 35(b).
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should be allowed to cooperate with the government and receive a break
at sentencing in return.
Different guiding principles will lead in radically different
directions. Quite simply, if the prosecutor wants to lower crime by
taking out those best able to run a drug organization, she will allow the
lower-level dealers to cooperate against the others. On the other hand, if
she wants to pursue as many lawbreakers as possible, she may choose to
allow the leader to testify against all the others.
At present, how to approach the case is decided at the local level.18
Without a national directive in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,
we are left to guess what will be important in any given case. Currently,
the DOJ lacks a consistent moral voice, set of goals, or meaningful role in
the larger political debate in our country.
D. A Call to Principle
The prosecutor described above is making important decisions on
behalf of the larger society, largely without directive guidance. In
attacking this lack of principle, this Article begins by briefly describing
the following two ways in which federal prosecutors are unique: first, in
their accumulation of power relative to others; and second, in their
independence from an electorate. Next, in Part III, this Article examines
the guidance in exercising discretion that federal prosecutors do receive.
In Part IV, this Article sets out several types of guiding principles and
discusses their relative merits. Finally, in Part V, this Article addresses
problems with the present system and the changes that a centralized,
directive principle might make in the practice of federal criminal law,
using the key-man principle as an example.
However, this Article is not about prosecutorial “ethics,” as ethics
are generally addressed in codes of behavior that still allow prosecutors
great amounts of discretion19—that is, what I am interested in here is not
ethics, but the principled use of discretion within the bounds already set
by ethical codes. Further, I do not seek to weigh in on the validity of the
Sentencing Guidelines or sentencing reform in the wake of Booker, which
I have already done elsewhere in articles and in testimony before the

See infra Part III.
For example, in Texas the code of ethics permits prosecutors to prosecute any charge
“supported by probable cause.” Texas Rules of Professional Conduct, TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN. tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A, art. 10, § 9, R. 3.09(a) (Vernon 1998).
18
19
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U.S. Sentencing Commission.20 Nor is it a critique of the policies of the
U.S. Justice Department.21 Finally, it is not an attempt to weigh in on the
debate over whether prosecutorial discretion is a good or bad thing;
rather, I am using this moment to argue that prosecutors should use the
discretion that they do have in a way that consistently follows publicly
articulated, goal-oriented principles that are specific enough to direct
discrete actions. What, exactly, is the “justice” being pursued by our
increasingly powerful DOJ? It is time to put some meat on those bones
and flesh out the exact nature of this justice that we are pursuing with
such expense and intensity.
II. THE UNIQUE ROLE OF FEDERAL PROSECUTORS
Federal prosecutors are unique in the realm of criminal law in at
least two respects. First, they have more power than almost anyone in
the federal system (even after Booker).22 Second, unlike nearly all state
prosecutors,23 they are not elected,24 but rather, they are removed by
several levels from an official (the President of the United States) who is
publicly elected. Thus, federal prosecutors do not need to prepare for or
respond to the expression of public will embodied in elections.25 Because
prosecutors simply have more discretion than anyone else (save the
judge) and because they do not have elections as a check on their actions,
the articulation of guiding, directive principles on the use of such
discretion is made more important.

20
See WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF MARK OSLER BEFORE THE U.S. SENTENCING COMM. (Nov.
17, 2004), available at www.ussc.gov/hearings/11_16_04/osler.pdf; Mark Osler, Indirect
Harms and Proportionality: The Upside-Down World of Federal Sentencing, 74 MISS. L. J. (2005)
(forthcoming) [hereinafter Osler, Indirect Harms]; Mark Osler, The Blakely Problem and the 3x
Solution, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 344 (2004) [hereinafter Osler, The Blakely Problem]; Mark Osler,
Uniformity and the Death of Traditional Sentencing Goals in the Age of Feeney, 16 FED. SENT. REP.
253 (2004); Mark Osler, Must Have Got Lost: Traditional Sentencing Goals, The False Trail of
Uniformity and Process, and the Way Back Home, 54 S.C. L.REV. 649 (2003) [hereinafter Osler,
Must Have Got Lost].
21
Admittedly, implicit in my argument is a critique of the DOJ insofar as it has failed to
adopt the type of principle I urge here.
22
Much of the power accorded prosecutors will continue under advisory guidelines.
For example, it will still require a prosecutor’s recommendation to get out from under a
mandatory minimum sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000).
23
See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, Prosecutors in State Courts,
2001, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN 2 (July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Prosecutors in State
Courts] (noting that only Alaska, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, and New Jersey do
not elect their chief prosecutors).
24
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
25
See Stuntz, supra note 8, at 544.
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A. Empowered Prosecutors
1.

Power Under Advisory Guidelines

Even under the post-Booker regime, which may change at any
moment, should Congress enact new laws, prosecutors would wield
tremendous power. The shift to advisory guidelines does not mean all
former powers of prosecutors evaporate. Many judges may choose to
follow the lead of the first federal District Court judge to rule in the postBooker environment, Paul G. Cassell of Utah.26 In a ruling the day after
Booker was announced, Cassell ruled that he would continue to give the
guidelines “considerable weight” in sentencing, and he proceeded to
sentence the defendant precisely as the guidelines directed.27 So long as
judges similarly follow old practices, prosecutors’ power will be
undiminished.28
2.

The Power to Evade Mandatory Minimums

Further, the Booker decision still leaves the discretion to evade
mandatory minimums solely in the hands of prosecutors.29 The judge, in
contrast, has no similar unilateral method by which to evade mandatory
minimums.30 If a prosecutor charges the case as a qualifying felony,
provides notice, and the defendant is properly convicted by plea or at
trial, the judge does not have the option of reducing the sentence below
the minimum.31 Understandably, this has led to some resentment on the
part of the judiciary and others.32 Even from the bench, some federal
judges have expressed their anger.33

26
United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (2005). Only a few days after Wilson was
decided, federal District Court Judge Lynn Adelman of Wisconsin took a contrary view,
holding that “[t]he approach espoused in Wilson is inconsistent with the holdings of the
merits majority in Booker. . . .” United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 985 (E.D. Wis.
2005).
27
Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d. at 925.
28
Notably, the Wilson decision did not involve considerations such as cooperation with
the government, which may have brought other factors into play. Id. at 926-31.
29
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000).
30
See Id.
31
See Id.
32
Mandatory minimum sentences under 21 U.S.C. § 841 have been especially
controversial. In a recent book, even radio comedian Garrison Keillor specifically criticized
this law, stating:
[M]andatory minimum sentences for minor drug possession–
guidelines in the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act that sailed through
Congress without benefit of public hearings, drafted before an election
by Democrats afraid to be labeled ‘soft on drugs’–and so a marijuana
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The Power of the Cornucopia of Possible Charges

Moreover, much of the power of the prosecutor has nothing to do
with the sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums.
The
prosecutor’s power flows from the vast array of choices federal law
allows in charging a criminal case.34 This subject cannot be addressed
without mentioning the work of William Stuntz, who asserts that this
smorgasbord of prosecutorial options effectively shifts both lawmaking
and adjudication to a third party, the prosecutor,35 and then leaves that
absolute discretion in the hands of prosecutors, “subject to no review by
anyone else.”36 This results in a system which is needlessly arbitrary
because it “suffers from both too much law and too much discretion.”37
Stuntz proposes two solutions to this problem of pathological overcriminalization: Either severely limit prosecutorial discretion, or take the
job of crafting the penal code away from Congress.38 Here, I propose a
different solution to the same problem, which requires neither the
external limitation of prosecutorial discretion nor the abdication of an
essential function by Congress. The overbroad discretion should not be
limited by a warring outside force, or massive changes in the law, but by
the simple articulation of principle by the nation’s chief law enforcement
officer.39

grower can land in prison for life without parole while a murderer
might be in for eight years; no rational person can defend this, it is a
Dostoevskian nightmare and it exists only because politicians fled in
the face of danger.”
GARRISON KEILLOR, HOMEGROWN DEMOCRAT 100-01 (Viking 2004). This is not so different
than the point Harvard Law School’s Stuntz makes in saying that “both major parties have
participated in a kind of bidding war to see who can appropriate the label ‘tough on
crime.’” Stuntz, supra note 8, at 509.
33
Perhaps most notably, former U.S. Attorney and thirteen-year federal judge John S.
Martin resigned and published an article in the New York Times asserting that he no longer
wanted to be part of an “unjust” system. John S. Martin, Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A31.
34
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1-2721 (2000). Some penal laws, of course, are found in other sections
of the federal code, such as the codification of many narcotics trafficking laws. See, e.g., 21
U.S.C. § 841.
35
Stuntz, supra note 8, at 509.
36
William J. Stuntz, Reply: Criminal Law’s Pathology, 101 MICH. L. REV. 828, 838 (2002).
37
Stuntz, supra note 8, at 579.
38
Id.
39
See infra Part V.
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B. The Unelected Prosecutor
Unfortunately, the shift in discretion combines with a problem
unique to the federal system making principles important. Because
prosecutors are not elected in the federal system,40 they avoid having to
articulate principles publicly (in an election campaign) or to be subjected
to public scrutiny that compares those stated principles to their actions
(in subsequent elections).41 Thus, we are shifting power to an entity with
no need to respond to the will of the public.
In most states, the voting public elects a District Attorney, who then
determines the policies governing prosecution in that district.42 Elections
force principles into the mix in two ways: first, they force prosecutors to
state a reason, usually a principle, that they should be elected; second,
they must run on their record once elected, and much of that record is,
specifically, their employment of discretion that will be compared to the
principle they articulated.43 For example, if a candidate for District
Attorney declares that she will seek jail time for all drunk drivers, she is
making a promise about her future use of discretion that articulates the
principle of similar treatment for all offenders, regardless of the
situation. If the majority of voters agree, she is elected; if not, she loses.44
If elected, and she starts to allow probation for drunk drivers, it is likely
someone will run against her, decrying her broken promises. Thus, there
is within the system some requirement that prosecutors articulate
principles and live by them in their exercise of discretion.
There is no similar check within the federal system, no direct election
to force the definition and articulation of guiding principles.45 Rather,
the President appoints and the Senate confirms ninety-three U.S.
Attorneys, who serve at the pleasure of the President.46 The DOJ, and its
head, the Attorney General, can and do issue directives that bear on the
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
See Stuntz, supra note 8, at 544.
42
Prosecutors in State Courts, supra note 23, at 2 (noting that only Alaska, Connecticut, the
District of Columbia, and New Jersey do not elect their chief prosecutors).
43
See Stuntz, supra note 8, at 544 (“Local district attorneys charge murders and rapes and
robberies and drug deals because the local population demands it.”).
44
See id.
45
William Stuntz argues that this allows federal prosecutors to focus on their own career
advancement by, for example, pursuing high profile cases rather than the cases that make a
bigger difference in society. Id.
46
Dale A. Oesterle, Early Observations on the Prosecutions of Business Scandals 2002-2003:
On Sideshow Prosecutions, Spitzer’s Clash with Donaldson over Turf, the Choice of Civil or
Criminal Actions, and the Tough Tactic of Coerced Cooperation, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 443, 444
n.4 (2004).
40
41
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employment of discretion,47 but these are rarely if ever an issue in the
election of Presidents. For example, in 2003, Attorney General John
Ashcroft toughened the internal DOJ guidelines for charging defendants,
directing that prosecutors, with limited exceptions, charge “the most
serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are supported by the
facts of the case.”48 Though many viewed this guideline as a significant
change,49 it was hardly an important issue in the presidential election of
2004.
Thus, unelected prosecutors in the federal system are only in the
most indirect way forced to respond to public will or to articulate and
defend the use of discretion, in sharp contrast to state prosecutors who
can be thrown out every few years if they are out of step with the beliefs
of the local public or untrue to their promises.
III. THE FAILURE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO ARTICULATE
PRINCIPLES
Given the lack of elections to force the articulation of principles, it
may not be surprising that the DOJ, through the Attorney General or
elsewhere, has failed to assert the type of discretion-guiding principle
discussed here.50 At best, the DOJ has in the recent past pushed its
prosecutors to treat defendants harshly, though even this does not
appear to be consistently tied to any principle.
There are two national sources for guiding principles for prosecutors
who actually try cases, including: Directives from the Attorney General
and the United States Attorney’s Manual (“Manual”), which sets out the
policies for the DOJ. These two, of course, are mutually reinforcing—
directives from the Attorney General will presumably be incorporated
into the Manual.51 Unfortunately, neither of these sources has recently
espoused directives that meet the definition of principle I am using here.
Guiding principles should be goal-oriented, directive to prosecutors in
47
See Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft, to All Federal Prosecutors
(Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.
htm. [hereinafter Ashcroft Memorandum].
48
Id. at 2.
49
But see David Hechler, Some See Little Change, Others a Mired System; Ashcroft Echoes
Thornburgh, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 29, 2003, at 25.
50
See infra Part III.A.- B.
51
For example, the gist of the Ashcroft Memo was incorporated into the U.S. Attorney’s
Manual at 9-27.300. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.300, available at
www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm [hereinafter
MANUAL].
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the primary areas where discretion is employed, and consistently
applied.
A. Directives of the Attorney General
Perhaps the closest we have come to an articulation of guiding
principle is Attorney General Ashcroft’s 2003 memorandum regarding
charging procedures.52 That memo, issued to “all federal prosecutors,”53
directed prosecutors to “charge and pursue the most serious, readily
provable offense,”54 with six exceptions, which include the defendant’s
cooperation with the government (which, pursuant to the memo, can
lead to either a reduction in sentence or no charge at all)55 and other
“exceptional” cases in which a supervisor’s approval is received.56 In
that document, Ashcroft claimed that the new rules were imposed
because, “[f]undamental fairness requires that all defendants prosecuted
in the federal criminal justice system be subject to the same standards
and treated in a consistent manner.”57
While widely attacked as limiting the discretion of individual
Assistant U.S. Attorneys,58 a criticism that to some degree is probably
true, the Ashcroft memorandum does not meet the definition used here
for principled guidance (directive, goal-oriented, and consistent). First,
while it may be considered nominally goal-oriented in stating that it
seeks to subject criminals to the same standard and is consistent with the
across-the-board approach discussed in Part IV.A, it only affects one of
several areas of prosecutorial discretion.59 Second, even with this limited
application, the exceptions to the rule undermine any consistent
achievement of that goal, and the federal system of prosecution is too
decentralized for such a loose policy to have consistent effect.60
Nor is the Ashcroft memorandum very directive. On its face, the
memorandum is not very directive as to two of the most important
aspects of discretion available to federal prosecutors: whether to charge
Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 47.
Id. at 1.
54
Id. at 2.
55
Id. at 3.
56
Id. at 4.
57
Id. at 6.
58
See Amie N. Ely, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion as an Ethical Necessity: The Ashcroft
Memorandum’s Curtailment of the Prosecutor’s Duty to “Seek Justice,” 90 CORNELL L. REV. 237
(2004).
59
Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 47.
60
Id. at 2-4.
52
53
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at all61 and whether to dole out breaks in exchange for cooperation with
the government. While the memorandum does make an exception to the
rule for those who cooperate,62 it does not offer further guidance on the
crucial question of who gets the advantage of that exception, other than
to require (as do the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines) that the assistance be
substantial.63 Thus, it offers no direction to the Assistant U.S. Attorney
described in the hypothetical at the start of this Article.64 Nor is the
general directive of the Ashcroft Memorandum likely to be consistently
employed, given the broad ability of nearly one hundred U.S. Attorneys
to alter its terms on a case-by-case basis.
While it is fair to say that the Ashcroft Memorandum limits
discretion, it cannot be said in equal measure that it provides principled,
goal-oriented, and consistent guidance in the employment of discretion.
Simply limiting discretion by demanding the harshest possible outcome
is not a principled act without an honest articulation of the broader goals
sought.65
B. The U.S. Attorney’s Manual
The Manual is a book issued by the DOJ to U.S. Attorneys and their
Assistants, setting out policies relating to prosecution.66 At least
nominally, it strives to set out principles, as well: Section 9-27, in fact, is
titled “Principles of Federal Prosecution.”67 It sets out several sections
specifically devoted to initiating prosecution,68 selecting charges,69
drafting plea agreements,70 and entering into non-prosecution
agreements in exchange for cooperation.71
One would hope that the Manual would provide exactly the sort of
directive, goal-oriented principle capable of consistent application
described here, but the Manual fails on all three counts. It is neither
directive nor formulated in furtherance of a discernable goal of criminal
61
As noted above, William Stuntz has argued that this is the most significant area of
discretion. Supra Part II.A.3.
62
Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 47, at 3.
63
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2002).
64
See supra Part I.C.
65
The Ashcroft memo cannot be seen as mandating the across-the-board principle, for
the reasons set out infra Part IV.A.
66
MANUAL, supra note 51.
67
Id.
68
Id. §§ 9-27.200-270.
69
Id. §§ 9-27.300-320.
70
Id. §§ 9-27.400-450.
71
Id. §§ 9-27.600-640.
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law, and the direction it does provide is not capable of consistent
application.
1.

The Manual Is Not Directive

The first order of business in articulating principles through the
Manual, it seems, is to put away any sense that the Manual is to provide
concrete direction to individual prosecutors. Almost immediately, the
Manual announces that “it is not intended that reference to these
principles will require a particular prosecutorial decision in any given
case.”72 Rather than providing firm direction, the Manual is best viewed
as being vaguely advisory,73 and further it hedges being directive at
nearly every point of discrete decision by leaving real decision-making to
the local level.
Consider, for example, the crucial discretion accorded prosecutors in
deciding who may be afforded a sentencing break for cooperation. On
this point, the Manual provides almost no guidance, saying only that the
prosecutor should weigh “all relevant considerations,” including:
(1) The importance of the investigation or prosecution
to an effective program of law enforcement; (2) The
value of the person’s cooperation to the investigation or
prosecution; and (3) The person’s relative culpability in
connection with the offense or offenses being
investigated or prosecuted and his/her history with
respect to criminal activity.74
Certainly, these are important considerations, but they are not
directive in a given case where several candidates for cooperation
present themselves. For example, it is the most culpable target who
almost always will have the most useful information, putting the first
consideration in conflict with the third. In a real case, such as the one
described at the start of this Article,75 it does little to push the prosecutor
toward using either the leader, the managers, or the dealers as
cooperators.

Id. § 9-27.120(B).
This vagueness may be intentional, so as to avoid creating a cause of action for
defendants. However, this seems to be expressly barred by the text of the Manual. Id. § 927.150.
74
Id. § 9-27.620.
75
See supra Part I.C.
72
73
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Elsewhere, the Manual cedes near-total authority to local supervisors
who need only to articulate their reasoning. For example, in discussing
the charges to be brought, the Manual sounds tough in saying (consistent
with the Ashcroft memorandum)76 that prosecutors should charge “the
most serious offense that is consistent with the nature of the defendant’s
conduct and that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction.”77 In the
end, however, the Manual allows that a prosecutor “may drop readily
provable charges with the specific approval of the U.S. Attorney or
designated supervisory level official for reasons set forth in the file of the
case.”78 Thus, provided she can talk a supervisor into it, any charge can
be dropped.79 The Manual then goes so far as to suggest very broad
reasons that a supervisor may want to approve dropping charges,
including “because the United States Attorney’s Office is particularly
overburdened,”80 and “the case would be time-consuming to try.”81
Given that the Manual would provide support for nearly any
decision as to the selection of cooperators and charges, it can hardly be
seen as directive.
2.

The Manual Is Not Goal-Oriented

The key to a principled system in the concrete and steel world of
prosecution is that it firmly focus on a goal. Unfortunately, the Manual
offers no consistent articulation of what it hopes to achieve in real terms
subject to evaluation, and the direction it does offer is not informed by
any such over-arching goal.
The goals it does articulate are unimpeachable but ultimately
meaningless; the preface to the Principle of Federal Prosecution, for
example, proudly announces that:
The availability of this statement of principles to Federal
law enforcement officials and to the public serves two
important purposes: ensuring the fair and effective
exercise of prosecutorial responsibility by attorneys for
the government, and promoting confidence on the part
of the public and individual defendants that important

76
77
78
79
80
81

Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 47, at 1.
MANUAL, supra note 51, § 9-27.300.
Id. § 9-27-400(B).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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prosecutorial decisions will be made rationally and
objectively on the merits of each case.82
I think it is a good idea for prosecutorial decisions to be made
“rationally.”83 Few could argue with prosecutors being “fair and
effective.”84 The problem is that to the Assistant U.S. Attorney deciding
who gets a break for cooperation, the goals of acting rationally and fairly
do not address the issues at hand, as there are many rational and fair
options available.85 Sadly, this is as close as the Manual gets to
articulating an overarching and principled goal for the project of federal
prosecution.
Within the specific directives of the Manual, vague as they are, there
is also little one could call goal-oriented. For example, the suggestion
that the most serious readily provable offense be charged (unless, of
course, the office is busy or the case might prove time-consuming),86
goes nominally towards the goal of prosecuting all offenders to the
fullest extent possible. This goal, however, is undercut not only by the
exceptions built into the charging directive87 but also by the Manual’s
own discussion of those for whom the prosecutor can decline
prosecution,88 citing that the offense does not seem very serious,89 that
the target has not been in trouble before,90 that the target is old (or
young),91 or that her sentence probably would not be very long.92
3.

The Manual Is Not Amenable to Consistent Application

a.

The decentralization of principle

Even to the limited degree that the Manual provides direction to
individual prosecutors, that direction is unlikely to be consistently
followed because of the degree of autonomy afforded to local U.S.
Attorneys and the supervisors a notch below them in the pecking order.

82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
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Id. § 9-27.001.
Id.
Id.
See infra Part IV.
MANUAL, supra note 51, § 9-27.400(B).
See id. § 9.27-300.
See id. § 9-27.230(B).
Id. § 9-27.230(B)(2).
Id. § 9-27.230(B)(5).
Id. § 9-27.230(B)(7).
Id. § 9-27.230(B)(8).
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At each crucial stage of prosecution, as the Manual itself
acknowledges, it is the Assistant U.S. Attorney assigned to the case and
his immediate supervisor who make most important policy decisions
without concrete guidance from the Manual (or elsewhere).93 The choice
to initiate or decline prosecution, for example, is left to the trial attorney,
who is merely told to “weigh all relevant considerations” when
considering whether or not there is a substantial federal interest.94
Recently, the Wall Street Journal, in a front page article, exposed the
unusual ways this choice is made by local prosecutors, including the
prosecution of convenience-store robberies in Fort Worth, a crime that
almost universally would be considered a state concern.95
At best, this allows for a principle to exist at the level of the
individual U.S. Attorney, who can issue directives to his assistants who
try criminal cases. Some see real benefits in such decentralization,96 but
in the end this decentralization frustrates the goal of a consistent and
national law enforcement policy.97
By putting nearly all concrete policy-setting decisions in the hands of
the DOJ’s trial lawyers and their immediate supervisors, it is effectively
guaranteed that the Manual will not create consistent national
applications. Whether, for example, a convenience store robbery will be
a federal concern is not resolved by a centralized, guiding principle
articulated by the DOJ but by the whim and reasoning of the local
prosecutor. In Fort Worth, it may be a federal concern; in Oklahoma
City, it may not be.98

See supra Part III.B.1-2.
MANUAL, supra note 51, § 9-27.230(A).
95
Gary Fields, Sentencing Shift: In Criminal Trials, Venue Is Crucial but Often Arbitrary,
WALL S.J., December 30, 2004, at A1, available at 2004 WL-WSJ 98745848.
96
See Reena Raggi, Local Concerns, Local Insights: Further Reasons for More Flexibility in
Guideline Sentencing, 5 FED. SENT. REP. 306 (1993).
97
To have such a policy does not destroy the ability to handle crime at the local level. It
is not as if there is a dearth of local law enforcement mechanisms, after all. Even without
federal law enforcement mechanisms, there are multiple layers of organization to address
crime. For example, I write this as I sit at my desk at Baylor University in Waco, Texas.
Should I decide to cook up some methamphetamine as I write, who could burst in to arrest
me? Not only the Baylor police, but the Waco police, the county sheriff’s deputies, the
Texas Rangers, officers of the Texas Department of Public Safety, or members of the
Agriplex Task force, a multi-agency force that focuses on methamphetamine cases. Even
should the DEA or the FBI enter the scene, they would always be free to refer the case to
state, rather than federal, prosecutors.
98
Fields, supra note 95.
93
94
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Thus, the massive Manual consumes hundreds of pages but fails to
direct any kind of principled, consistent exercise of discretion by federal
prosecutors, robbing our leading law enforcers of the mantle of credible
moral authority.
b.

The problem of inconsistency

Is it a problem that the Manual and other sources fail to consistently
guide the employment of discretion by federal prosecutors in a
principled way? It is, in at least three respects: First, it prevents the
federal government from seizing the moral high ground (and resulting
public support) it would receive if its criminal law efforts were directed
by an articulated moral basis reflected in actions. Second, it makes
federal crime-fighting efforts nearly immune to any concrete calibration
of success, as there is no set of articulated and principled goals defined
against which results can be measured.99 Third, decentralization of
principle results in a moral mushiness which has effectively withdrawn
criminal law issues from electoral politics at the federal level.
There is a problem when an issue as important as law enforcement is
somehow left off the national political agenda. Which, of course, leads to
the question of how the articulation of principle might help to solve that
problem.
IV. FOUR GOAL-ORIENTED PRINCIPLES TO CONSISTENTLY GUIDE
DISCRETION
What principles could be used to guide discretion? While this
Article does not pretend to present the full range of possibilities, it will
describe at least four principles that could be used to guide discretion
consistently. As will become clear in my discussion of them, I do not
view them as being of equal merit; I have a favorite,100 but I do not deny
that the others would also be directive, goal-oriented, and consistently
guide discretion. I have chosen these four because they are the ones I

99
Certainly, the DOJ at times seems to measure its success against statistics, such as the
number of prosecutions brought, defendants convicted, or changes in the crime rate. For
example, look at the statistics found at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2004/
TableofContents.htm. What is lacking, however, is a sense of how those statistics relate to
principled goals. For example, an increase in the number of federal prosecutions means
nothing in terms of crime control if it is simply replacing cases formerly dealt with by the
states, but this may be seen as a measure of success if the principle informing prosecutorial
action is across-the-board enforcement of federal laws.
100
See infra Part V.B.
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variously used to justify my actions in my own brief career as a federal
prosecutor from 1995-2000.
In turn, these four principles include the following: (1) Across-theBoard Law Enforcement, which directs that anyone who breaks a law be
aggressively prosecuted, with the goal of convicting as many wrongdoers as possible;101 (2) Leveling, in which the affluent and advantaged
are treated more harshly than those who have been disadvantaged;102 (3)
Message Sending, which seeks to achieve general deterrence through the
use of prosecutorial discretion;103 and (4) Key-Man Targeting, which seeks
to incapacitate those who do the most harm to society.104
Notably, what is addressed here is precisely the prosecutorial sorting
process that William Stuntz identifies as crucial because, “[w]hether
prosecutors sort well determines whether the system allocates
punishment well, or even decently.”105 My belief, built on that truth, is
that the key to sorting well is a consistently-applied and goal-oriented
principle.106
In discussing these principles, one thing becomes very clear: They
are incompatible.107 While it may seem simple to say, for example, that I
am for both across-the-board law enforcement and for key-man targeting,
this is impossible. At ground level, where real decisions must be made,
these principles lead in opposite directions. By definition, targeting the
key men means targeting some people and not others, immediately
undercutting the principle of across-the-board law enforcement, which
calls for the prosecutor to pursue all lawbreakers with equal vigor.
Similarly, it is a lie to say we are pursuing both message-sending and
key-man targeting, as they lead in different directions for targeting
defendants.108 William Stuntz, in fact, recognized that what I call acrossthe-board law enforcement is incompatible with message-sending in

Infra Part IV.A.
Infra Part IV.B.
103
Infra Part IV.C.
104
Infra Part IV.D.
105
Stuntz, supra note 8, at 572.
106
See infra Part V.
107
Incompatible, at least, in the sense that they cannot be pursued effectively at the same
time. Like many prosecutors, I used different principles at different times, and generally
was an across-the-board prosecutor as a new Assistant U.S. Attorney and evolved into a
key-man practitioner by the end of my short career.
108
This is true because there are key men even in cases where a message will not easily
be sent, and the key man may not be the highest-profile individual yielding the strongest
message.
101
102
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noting that “[g]ood expression is worthless if no one can hear it . . . the
sum of millions of arrest and prosecution decisions by thousands of
police officers and prosecutors, seems designed to minimize
visibility.”109 Thus, we must choose one principle or the other, because
to say we are serving all of them is to abdicate principle at the outset.110
Interestingly, each of the principles I describe here focuses on a
different one of the four traditional goals of criminal sentencing:
punishment, rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation.111 Acrossthe-board law enforcement is principally concerned with maximum and
even-handed punishment; leveling is concerned primarily with social
reconstruction or rehabilitation; message-sending is based on the idea of
general deterrence; and key-man targeting uses incapacitation as its
primary tool.
A. Across-the-Board Law Enforcement
This principle expresses an undifferentiated belief in the value of
punishment and seeks to punish as many people as possible who break
the law, regardless of other factors or concerns. It views all laws as equal
in weight and does not concern itself with relative culpability. In short,
it mirrors the plain language of the penal code, which draws a bright line
between acceptable and punishable acts, and does not differentiate
between felonies, except insofar as they are classified and subject to
different punishments mandated by Congress.
The principle informing across-the-board law enforcement is
attractive: It reflects a profound belief in representative democracy,
seeking to enforce equally all of those laws passed by the elected
legislature. It defers the prioritization of crimes to Congress and then
accepts the laws issued by Congress at face value.
1.

Goals

The principle of across-the-board law enforcement has the following
two goals: prosecute as many lawbreakers as possible, and treat them
equally, but harshly, in sentencing (for example, by seeking the same
maximum sentence for all defendants). These goals are consistent with

Stuntz, supra note 8, at 522.
I do not question that it is politically possible to claim multiple principles. I do
challenge the idea that to effectively pursue multiple principles simultaneously is possible.
111
Patricia M. Wald, Why Focus on Women Offenders?, 16 CRIM. JUST. 10, 11 (Spring 2001)
(listing traditional goals of sentencing).
109
110
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the bright-line nature of this principle—there is a right and a wrong, and
those who do wrong should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.
To the degree that the Manual expresses any principled goal at all, it
is this one. For example, this principle seems to be the guiding force for
the Manual’s suggestion that targets be charged with the “most serious
offense that is consistent with the nature of the defendant’s conduct, and
that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction.”112 Thus, all criminals
are to be pursued equally, regardless of most other factors (such as
relative culpability or crime control considerations).
2.

Directives

To sincerely put the principle of across-the-board prosecution into
place, an Attorney General could direct that prosecutors are to charge
anyone who has violated a federal law113 and seek the highest possible
sentence.114 This principle would diverge considerably from the current
language of the Manual. For example, the current policy allows
individual prosecutors broad discretion to decline cases due to a lack of a
“substantial Federal interest.”115 Were the principle of a bright line
defined by Congress taken seriously, this discretion would be severely
limited, and trial attorneys would be directed to charge anyone who
broke a federal law; the fact that an action is proscribed by federal law in
itself would be seen as defining a substantial federal interest. In other
words, instead of substituting their own judgment for how federal
jurisdiction should be defined, prosecutors would defer to the
jurisdiction already defined by the legislature.
Similarly, prosecutors could be directed to consistently seek the
highest possible sentence for each target, revoking the current discretion
allowed to individual Assistant U.S. Attorneys to make sentencing
recommendations they believe to be in the “public interest.”116
3.

Consistent Application

It certainly would be possible to prosecute anything that falls under
federal law in federal court. In fact, the increasing federalization of

MANUAL, supra note 51, § 9-27.300(A).
This would replace the current wishy-washy declination suggestions contained in
§§ 9-27.200-260 of the Manual.
114
In place of the provisions of the Manual at § 9-27.710.
115
Id. § 9-27.230.
116
Id. § 9-27.730.
112
113
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criminal law117 seems to be moving in this direction.118 By focusing on
bright lines, the across-the-board philosophy provides a very clear guide
to cabining the actions of individual prosecutors. However, to do so
would be extremely expensive and inefficient, as described below.
4.

Analysis

At a fundamental level, the across-the-board approach has some
appeal. It would defer to the legislative branch the responsibility of
defining what prosecutors should address. Such deference would make
for great consistency. Perhaps not surprisingly, it appears to be this
principle that compelled Congress to affirmatively mandate that “except
as provided by law, each U.S. Attorney, within his district, shall (1)
Prosecute for all offenses against the United States.”119
On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that this approach,
while principled, is unworkable. First of all, there are a large number of
federal laws that overlap with state laws.120 Were the federal system to
take on all those cases within the overlap that are currently handled by
the states, the federal system would be quickly overwhelmed.121
Further, this system would make it difficult for prosecutors to build
cases around cooperating defendants.122 In a large criminal conspiracy,
for example, this principle would urge seeking the cooperation of the
most culpable defendants, as they are the ones with the most
information about the largest number of potential defendants. Thus, it
would lead to giving a break to the most culpable defendant so as to
convict the largest number of targets, an outcome that would be
troubling to many.
Finally, and most fundamentally, such a system defers decision to
the legislature. While this is a principled choice, and one consistent with
117
U.S. Sentencing Commissioner Michael O’Neill has termed it an “unrelenting
expansion” of federal criminal law. O’Neill, supra note 14, at 222; see also Fields, supra note
95.
118
Fields, supra note 95.
119
28 U.S.C. § 547 (2000) (emphasis added).
120
For example, federal laws almost completely overlap with state laws as to narcotics
trafficking, a major area of law enforcement activity. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000).
121
Suntz, supra note 8, at 507; Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Legislating Federal
Crime and Its Consequences: Toward a Principled Basis for Federal Criminal Legislation, 543
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 15, 15-19 (1996).
122
The tendency to build a case around cooperators is particularly strong in the area of
narcotics. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling
and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 928 (1999).
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the general structure of our government, it is unclear that Congress itself
is particularly principled in legislating criminal laws and sentences. As
has often been observed, federal criminal jurisdiction often expands but
rarely contracts,123 and sentences often go up but rarely go down,124 due
to the nature of electoral politics.125 This general expansion and
increasing harshness seems to be a function of electoral politics rather
than a guiding principle.126
B. Leveling
The principle behind leveling as a guide to prosecution is simple and
even instinctive to some. The principle behind leveling is that criminal
law should be harshest to those who have been most advantaged and
less harsh to those who have been disadvantaged. To some extent, we
see leveling as a present impulse in criminal law; for example, in the fact
that death penalty defendants are able to argue as a mitigating factor
their own misfortunes in seeking to avoid the death penalty and thus are
given an advantage not afforded those from a more privileged
background.127 Recently, some have seen leveling as part of the DOJ’s
motivation in the pursuit of Martha Stewart as a target of prosecution.128
Others might think of New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer as a
leveler, in that he has targeted the Wall Street elite for prosecution and
civil actions.129

Stuntz, supra note 8, at 507 (“[A]ll change in criminal law seems to push in the same
direction-toward more liability.”).
124
Zlotnick, supra note 2, at 243 n.199.
125
William Stuntz of Harvard has convincingly described the mechanism by which this
occurs. Stuntz, supra note 8, at 529-33.
126
Id.
127
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
128
The satirical weekly The Onion, in its own way, critiqued the Stewart sentencing with
an article entitled Poll: Americans Feel Safer with Martha Stewart in Jail, THE ONION, October
12, 2004, at 1. The article fictionally quoted Chicago welder Marvin Manckowicz as saying
that “I don’t know the technical aspects of it, but I know that Martha Stewart did
something with the stock market. . . . I’m not sure if she was selling her own stock or
someone else’s, but I do know that everyone said it was wrong. I breathed easier when I
found out she wasn’t going to be doing any more of that again for five months.” Id.; see also
Stephen Moore, What’s Wrong with Insider Trading?, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, available at
www.nationalreview.com/moore 200403090901.asp (March 9, 2004) (describing Stewart as
a “victim of class warfare”); Wesley Pruden, Saving the Streets from Martha Stewart,
WASHINGTON TIMES, March 9, 2004, at A4 (quoting a juror calling the verdict a victory for
“the average guy”).
129
E.g., Scott Walter, N.Y.’s AG Hits Bulls-Eye with Ebbers Suit, but Will It Stick?, JACKSON
(MS) CLARION LEDGER, October 13, 2002, at 1C.
123
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Goals

An Attorney General motivated by leveling would assert his
resources towards pursuing those who are advantaged and provide less
emphasis on pursuing the poor and disadvantaged, with the goal of
leveling off the advantages and disadvantages provided by other aspects
of society. In a sense, this could be considered rehabilitation for both
types of defendant—the rich are rehabilitated by being humbled, and the
poor are given a chance for rehabilitation through social services rather
than prison. That is, they are both rehabilitated by being brought to the
middle.
2.

Directives

A few simple directives could promote leveling. First, it would
target for prosecution those who are relatively powerful. In so doing, it
would likely prioritize cases very differently than they are today; there
would be a lessened emphasis on street crime prosecutions and a greater
focus on financial crimes and industrial polluters. Within drug cases,
this principle would lead to prosecutors being hard on the relatively
affluent ringleaders and much less harsh on street-level users and
dealers.130
In
drafting
plea
agreements
and
making
sentencing
recommendations, Assistant U.S. Attorney’s would also focus on relative
advantage. Given that the overwhelming majority of defendants are
from the undereducated, disadvantaged parts of society, at least for
those defendants the Attorney General could direct a much greater focus
on rehabilitation in sentencing.
3.

Consistent Application

Insofar as relative advantage is apparent, this principle could be
applied with some consistency. It would, however, require some
research into the background of defendants prior to charging if true
consistency was to be attained. Some subjectivity, of course, would
remain as to the important judgment of who is advantaged and who is
disadvantaged—some people may consider race to be a factor, others

130
In some instances, the key-man principle discussed below in Part IV.D may lead to the
same tactic, but for different reasons—the key-man prosecutor cares about the leader not
because he is rich but because he is essential to the running of the criminal organization.
Infra, Part IV.D.
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may consider only economic status, and still others may want to focus
primarily on education.
4.

Analysis

As noted above, some may feel that leveling is already a defining
principle in the practices of some prosecutors, such as New York
Attorney General Elliot Spitzer.131 However, the core problem with this
system is that it ignores the relative danger a particular target may
present to society, and it may not even offer coincidental benefit in terms
of lowering the crime rate.132 For example, there are many cases declined
by federal prosecutors in which the potential danger to society outstrips
that posed by Martha Stewart.
Further, because of the broad scope of federal prosecution, some
areas of crime are not easily considered by the guiding principle of
leveling. The important area of gun crime, for example, often would not
allow for direction based on this principle, as relative social or economic
advantage may not be a factor. While leveling could be a guiding
principle for certain decisions, particularly who to charge, it would not
provide guidance for some broad areas of discretion.
Also, this principle could be problematic as applied to cooperators.
The most advantaged defendant may not be the most culpable. For
example, if a drug conspiracy involved several minority members from
disadvantaged backgrounds and one rich college student, leveling might
lead to harsher treatment of the college student, even if he were in the
lower echelons of the organization.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the idea of leveling,
particularly on racial or socio-economic grounds, likely violates the
important (and constitutional) principle of equal protection.133 There is
something innately offensive to many Americans about the idea of
targeting people for prosecution and harsh sentences based on race,
social class, wealth, or education. In fact, recent trends have been to
expressly bar such considerations in investigation and prosecution. For
example, racial profiling laws bar the consideration of such factors in

Supra note 129.
The across-the-board principle, though it does not have crime control as a central goal,
will probably achieve some measure of crime control simply by addressing so much of the
population.
133
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, § 5H1.10 (2004).
131
132
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police investigations,134 and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have
strictly barred race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socioeconomic status from consideration in sentencing.135
In short, leveling may be appealing to some as social policy, but as a
basis for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the use of wealth,
education, and race as sorting factors raises practical problems and
would invite attack as being contrary to the principle of equal protection
both as embodied in the Constitution of the United States136 and as
expressed otherwise in contemporary society.
C. Message Sending
A third guiding principle for prosecution might be to construct
prosecutions so as to send a message to prospective lawbreakers, in
order to lower crime by deterring others through fear of punishment.
The underlying principle here is that crime control is most important and
that general deterrence is the best way to control crime.137
Message sending has clearly been a motivating principle to many
prosecutors, though rarely in a systemic way. For example, when he was
the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Rudolph
Giuliani often had targets arrested in the most public way possible.138
Wall Street traders were arrested at their offices, then paraded past their
colleagues in handcuffs, a calculated spectacle meant to send a clear
message to those colleagues and others who might see the event on the
evening news.139 It cannot be doubted that this was intended to send a
message to others.
Giuliani had other tactics for message-sending as well. For example,
he chose one day a week to be “federal day,” in which all street-level
drug dealers were taken to federal instead of state court where they
received much higher sentences. One such dealer, who would have been

134
For example, Texas law flatly states that “[a] peace officer may not engage in racial
profiling.” TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 2.131 (Vernon 2003).
135
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, § 5H1.10 (2004).
136
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
137
By general deterrence I mean something done to deter people other than the
defendant; I would term things done to deter the defendant himself specific deterrence.
138
Shaun G. Clarke, Beware Collision of Politics and Public Relations, NEW ORLEANS TIMES
PICAYUNE, August 1, 2002, at Metro p. 6.
139
Id.
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subjected to a four-year term in state court, received life without parole
in federal court. 140
1.

Goals

The principle goal of message sending is to reduce crime through
general deterrence. It tries to do so efficiently, by using a few highprofile cases to convey the message of deterrence, in the hope of
avoiding a larger number of crimes down the road because the potential
criminals were deterred.
Interestingly, unlike leveling, a crime-control system can measure its
results in a direct way; success would mean a decrease in crime rates.
Thus, it offers an advantage over some other systems within the larger
system of political debate in that it can be held to an objective standard.
2.

Directives

To employ message sending, the Attorney General would have to
require a conscious use of the media. Press coverage would be sought of
the arrests, arraignments, pleas, trials, and sentencing of key targets.
Central to the idea of message sending is that the message is
communicated.141
As to the discrete decisions that constitute prosecutorial discretion,
the targeting of defendants would certainly be affected—those targets
most likely to have an emotional impact on the public are best chosen.
However, in many cases, where none of the potential targets have a high
profile, the principle of message-sending offers little guidance.
Similarly, as to the selection of who is going to be given an
opportunity to cooperate, only limited direction could be offered.
Ideally, low-profile targets would be offered the opportunity to testify
against high-profile targets. Again, however, this directive does not
apply in cases where none of the targets have a high profile.
3.

Consistent Application

As to those areas where this policy could be directive, it would be
amenable to consistent application. However, one area of subjectivity is
Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 1000-01 (1995).
141
Some may claim that messages are best sent through the informal network of
neighborhoods and jails, but such communications are almost impossible to measure.
140
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the decision as to which targets are high-profile. That could depend on
the local media and sense of the community and would vary from place
to place.
4.

Analysis

Message sending has an obvious attraction: It provides a possible
way to reduce crime without having to convict all those who violate the
law. This system relies on relatively fewer convictions to deter others
from committing crimes.
There are problems, however. First, as discussed above, in many
cases, perhaps even the majority of cases, message sending is not
possible because none of the potential targets are likely to garner much
attention. Thus, this principle simply does not affect many of the
prosecutorial exercises of discretion made at the federal level.
Second, this plan relies on effective communication of the message
being sent. In turn, this means a reliance on the media with which many
would be uncomfortable. Media outlets, of course, have their own biases
and motivations that have little to do with justice or crime control. At
any rate, there is not much precedent for effective, measurable message
sending.142
Finally, message sending relies on the assumption that criminals are
rational in their actions—that is, that they weigh the costs and benefits of
committing a crime before they act. Even if this is true, it is more likely
to be accurate with relation to some crimes (financial fraud, tax evasion)
than others (manslaughter).
D. Key-Man Targeting
Like message sending, key-man targeting reflects the core belief that
crime control is the primary goal of criminal law. It differs from message
sending, however, in the way it attempts to lower crime rates. Rather
than seeking general deterrence, key-man targeting attempts to lower
crime by incapacitating those relatively few individuals who make many
crimes possible. It does so by targeting two types of individual
defendants, the dangerous recidivist and the key members of
conspiracies or other criminal networks who have the rarest skills.

142
Stuntz, supra note 8, at 522. Stuntz notes that “if expressive criminal law is an ideal,
the ideal is at odds with the system of law and law enforcement we now have.” Id. at 523.
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Dangerous recidivists are usually identified by their criminal histories.143
Key members of conspiracies or criminal networks, in contrast, are
identified by examining their roles in offenses. In either case, this
principle reflects the belief that a relatively small number of people
either commit many crimes or make many crimes possible.144
Intriguingly, as applied to criminal networks and conspiracies, key-man
targeting takes advantage of market forces to reduce crime.145 For
example, one might consider the problem of the theft of car radios on a
military base. While the across-the-board adherent would attempt to
convict every thief and the message-sender might seek media attention
for the conviction of a few of these thieves, the key-man targeter is going
to turn his sights elsewhere: toward the out-of-state fence who buys
large volumes of the stolen goods. By taking away the market for stolen
goods, he can control crime with fewer convictions.146 The thieves
would be given much lesser sentences or sent to the state for
punishment,147 with breaks given to those who provide worthwhile
cooperation.148
Key-man targeting must take specific account of the market realities,
including labor markets, of the businesses in which large conspiracies
engage. For example, elsewhere I have described the crack trade at the
street level as being analogous to a bagel shop.149 The crack trade, like
the bagel trade, is a business, and both rely on similar labor markets.
Within the crack business, powder cocaine is usually converted to
crack on stovetops by people at the bottom rungs of the organization.
The current federal sentencing Guidelines already go far towards the long-term
incapacitation of such recidivists through provisions such as the career criminal provision,
which mandates long terms for violent felons and drug offenders who have at least two
prior convictions for that type of offense. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, § 4B1.1 (2004).
144
Note that this is distinct from the other crime-control system discussed here, such as
message sending, which is neutral on how many potential law-breakers there are.
145
By “market forces,” I mean either supply or demand of a commodity or service. Thus,
cutting off the supply of precursor chemicals (such as anhydrous ammonia) through
administrative action would make the manufacture of methamphetamine nearly
impossible.
146
Of course, to be effective, one must truly go after the key man as opposed to trying to
affect market forces by arresting large numbers of people. This is true for the simple reason
that key men with special skills are hard to replace; drug users are easy to replace.
147
Some prosecutors already use this tactic individually. However, to do so they must
pursue an individual more difficult to catch than the thief—to prove the fence guilty, the
prosecutor must prove that the fence knew the goods were stolen. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2313
(2000).
148
The sentencing guidelines, of course, already provide for a break for cooperation. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, § 5K1.1 (2004).
149
Osler, Must Have Got Lost, supra note 20, at 679 n.197.
143

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 3 [2005], Art. 2

652

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

Now think of your neighborhood bagel shop. Walk into that shop, and
you will see relatively low-paid employees making and selling the
bagels—the labor, in the same position as those who cook cocaine into
crack. They convert the dough shipped to the store into the end product,
bagels. The business is structured such that these low-paid workers can
be easily replaced in the inevitable event the store suffers high turnover.
The evidence is easy to see: The instructions to make the bagels are
posted on the wall. The process is kept simple, and jobs are specialized
to limit the amount of skill needed. If the goal is to close down that
bagel shop, it would be futile to address the problem by arresting the
counter help and bagel makers because the shop is structured for them to
be easily replaced.150 Instead, one would have to incapacitate the key
men and women in the chain—those who control logistics, financing, or
management through specialized skills not so easily replaced.151
The essence of key-man targeting is to pay much less attention to the
easily-replaced “bagel makers” and refocus resources to catching and
incapacitating the members of the network who are much less easily
replaced.152 After all, once the business owners with the ability to bring
in the dough and buy the machines are gone, there is no one to employ
the bagel makers.153
1.

Goals

The key-man targeter is relatively single-minded toward the goal of
reducing crime. This is capable of measurement and analysis, and
success can be precisely evaluated. A follower of this principled tactic is
probably going to take some political heat, as it would require that some
crimes presently prosecuted in federal court would be turned over to the
state or not prosecuted—maintaining this goal would probably make it
impossible to claim to be addressing all violations of criminal law.

Id.
Id.
152
The “bagel makers,” of course, still have value to the system as informants and
witnesses, and those who cooperated would be treated to the most significant breaks.
However, they would be treated much more lightly than they are now whether or not they
cooperated with the government and would not be charged to the fullest extent possible, as
the DOJ currently directs. MANUAL, supra note 51, § 9-27.300.
153
The reverse does not work—if you take away the bagel makers, the business owner
does not go away; rather, he just hires some more workers. He has structured his business,
after all, to allow for the easy replacement of these often transient workers.
150
151
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Directives

An Attorney General implementing key-man targeting would make
several specific directives to federal prosecutors. First, she would revise
the standards for selecting prosecution targets so that the primary basis
for selection would be the direct effect on crime control. This would
have concrete effects. For example, as discussed above, in addressing
narcotics such an Attorney General would focus direct investigations
toward those who have the key business skills that make such a drug
organization work and are not easily replaceable: the money managers,
the logistics men, and the importers. Street-level dealers and users
would not be subjected to the same treatment.
At each stage of the process, the same imperatives would apply.
Plea agreements would be structured so that those who are easily
replaceable in a conspiracy would testify against those who are not
easily replaceable. In sentencing, prosecutors would be specifically
directed to seek long, incapacitating sentences against those who are
most crucial to crime control. As a result, a prosecutor would seek a
long sentence against the man who establishes a sophisticated boilerroom fraud operation but not for the operator who is paid to make the
calls.154
3.

Consistent Application

Key-man targeting would allow for consistent application of
principle over a broad array of cases. While in conspiracy cases it would
direct the irreplaceable to be targeted rather than the easily replaced, this
principled tactic provides guidance even when the crime is committed
by individual actors. In such cases, the targets would be evaluated
according to the long-term threats they pose in the context of the larger
picture. For example, a drug possessor would be unlikely to be
prosecuted to the fullest extent possible, provided key parts of the drug
network supplying him are being addressed. On the other hand, a twotime bank robber would be seen as an appropriate target for lengthy
incapacitation because he poses a significant future risk, even absent the
involvement of others. Even in the most mundane single-defendant
cases, this principle would be directive by emphasizing the factor of
criminal history, making repeat offenders much more important targets
154
This would be a different tactic than that urged by the current Manual and its directive
to seek the maximum charge for each defendant. See MANUAL, supra note 51, § 9-27.300
(providing that the person making the calls and the man running the operation may well
be charged with the same crime).
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than first offenders. The theory is that the recidivist is more likely to
cause more crime in the future and needs to be incapacitated.155
Of course, some areas of subjectivity would remain, creating
inconsistencies from district to district. For example, the determination
of who was a key-man, in most cases, would still be made locally and
would be subject to varying interpretations.
4.

Analysis

Because key-man prosecution is used as an example in the following
section, much of the analysis of this principle is provided there.156
However, it should be noted that while key-man prosecution could
achieve the goal of reducing specific types of crime, it would have the
side effect of limiting the scope of federal prosecution. Entire categories
of crime that are currently addressed by federal prosecutors (such as
drug possession) would be left to the states. Given the apparent impulse
of Congress to constantly enlarge federal criminal jurisdiction,157 the
required contraction of the scope of actual federal prosecutions (albeit
with the goal of greater gains) may prove to be politically unpopular.
V. THE CHANGES PRINCIPLE WOULD BRING
A. The Problems of a Decentralized System
Before describing what principle-based centralized guidance of
prosecutorial discretion would do to federal criminal law, this Part
reviews the problems caused by the lack of such an articulated principle,
previously addressed in Part III.B.3.b.
1.

Decentralization Muddies Morality

The present lack of a national organizing principle prevents the
federal government from being a secular moral force within the nation.158
Federal prosecutions, such as the Martha Stewart case, are often a topic
Key-man targeting may even lead to incapacitation of serious recidivists more harsh
than those that result under a straightforward application of the Guidelines. The Booker
opinion, after all, would allow the judge to set aside the guideline range and value criminal
history as a more important component than is reflected in the Guideline calculation. See
Booker v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
156
See infra Part V.
157
Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 121, at 15-19.
158
However one chooses to define morality, it will include principle. Thus, to be moral,
our government must first be principled. The reverse, of course, is not true—one can hold
principles that are immoral.
155
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of national discussion or debate, but each case seems to reflect a different
goal and a different morality. For example, Martha Stewart seems to be
a case of leveling, and at any rate, it cannot be defended on crime control
grounds. Obviously, a different goal must motivate the continuing
prosecution of street-level drug dealers by federal agencies. Thus, any
larger message or goal is swallowed up in the inevitable
inconsistencies.159
2.

Decentralization Makes It Impossible to Measure Success

Though crime statistics and prosecution numbers are often
trumpeted by the DOJ, without a moral center there is no set of
articulated and principled goals against which results can be measured.
Success is consistently declared without a true meaning.
3.

Decentralization Takes Criminal Law out of the National Political
Debate

Finally, decentralization of principle means there are no articulations
of principle to debate. Though I do not advocate the direct election of
the Attorney General or U.S. Attorneys, a public articulation of guiding
principles beyond standing against crime and for fairness would allow
for a worthwhile debate of criminal law issues during the run-up to
national elections.
B. What a National, Principled System Might Look Like
Part IV, in a very brief way, sets out the way four directive, goaloriented, and consistent principles to guide prosecutorial discretion on a
national basis might look. To better understand the results from such a
change, consider one such hypothetical, the key-man crime control
system. To put this principle into effect, the Attorney General would
first have to publicly name and claim that principle, while honestly
conceding this would mean that some other principles (for example,
across-the-board enforcement) would not be pursued.
Second, the Attorney General would have to make the Manual more
directive, more binding, and thoroughly attuned to the principle
articulated. That would require the following changes (using key-man
targeting as an example):

Those inconsistencies are inevitable in large part because of the over-criminalization
others have so well described. Stuntz, supra note 8.

159
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The Attorney General Would Publicly State the Principle

The Attorney General seems to have a wealth of media attention.
She should, upon deciding on a principle goal for federal prosecution,
state that principled goal clearly and publicly, including the measures by
which the successful attainment of that goal will be evaluated.
2.

The Manual Would Become Directive and Binding

No longer could the Manual effectively allow nearly every direction
relating to the exercise of discretion to be defined at the local level.
Rather, the Manual would have to present itself as mandatory
instructions in approaching individual cases,160 and the evaluation of
individual prosecutors and supervisors would need to be based on how
well those directions were followed. No longer could each prosecutor be
a separate moral force, and no longer would the fate of a defendant
depend largely on which Assistant U.S. Attorney received responsibility
for the case.
Rather than leaving the acceptance or declination of cases largely up
to the whims of individual prosecutors, much firmer guidelines would
have to be designed.161 For example, to reflect the key-man principle, the
federal prosecution of drug possessors and street-level dealers might be
limited,162 as there is a potentially endless supply, and the process of
incarcerating them does not seem to stem the tide. In other cases,
prosecutors would be directed to accept only those cases where the
incapacitation of the defendant would realistically deprive others of the
ability to commit crimes in the future or who individually pose a special
risk of future danger. This is a net through which Martha Stewart or a

160
Ironically, perhaps, as the sentencing guidelines become advisory rather than binding
under Booker, I am suggesting that the Manual become more binding and less advisory.
However, it is important to recognize that the more binding nature of the Manual simply
means that the Attorney General would hold U.S. Attorneys and their assistants to the
directives of the Manual through administrative action, and I do not contemplate creating a
right of action through which defendants could seek to hold individual prosecutors to
those directives, as discussed below.
161
Much firmer than those found in sections 9-27.200-260 of the Manual.
162
It would need to be limited in a way which allowed for there to still be pressure on
such defendants to cooperate with the investigation. Such pressure, of course, can still be
applied even when relative sentences are reduced or cases shifted to state prosecution. If
the defendant stays in the federal system, he could be recommended for a sentence of
probation, for example, if otherwise appropriate. If he is shifted to the state system, the
prosecutor would have to cooperate closely with her colleague in the District Attorney’s
office.
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drug possessor would not pass, but the drug importer, the internet fraud
master and the counterfeiting printer would.
The selection of charges and formulation of plea agreements would
follow the same principle, of course—rather than seeking the highest
available charge against everyone, prosecutors would be directed to seek
the highest available charge against those who would make the most
difference through employment of their skills or future dangerousness.
Similarly, key-man prosecution would lead to the fairly specific goal,
which is related to sentencing, incapacitating those who are most crucial
to criminal networks or pose the greatest risk of committing serious
federal crimes in the future. As to those targets, the key-man prosecutor
has little use for the traditional sentencing goals of retribution, general
deterrence, or rehabilitation. Thus, at least to those defendants, the goal
of incapacitation would eclipse the others. As to non-key targets,
however (for example, those lesser lights who cooperated against the
kingpin), this principle would allow for a much broader consideration of
rehabilitation than is seen in contemporary criminal law. Prosecutors
would lock up the ones who make crime work and try to fix those who
would be easily replaced anyways.
However, this does not mean that the Manual would create a cause
of action for defendants. Quite simply, it would be wise to retain that
part of the present Manual that provides that it does not “create a right or
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party to
litigation with the United States.”163
C. Benefits and Drawbacks of a National, Principled System
1.

Benefits

Were the DOJ to accept the key-man principle and adopt the
proposals set out above, several benefits seem obvious. First, it would
address the problems of decentralization as described. Specifically, it
would allow the DOJ to take a moral high ground and consistently
defend its actions. Success could be measured over the long term against
the specific goal of crime control in target areas of federal concern, and
the key-man principle could be openly debated in the context of national
elections.

163

MANUAL, supra note 51, § 9-27.150.
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It would also save money while very possibly achieving better
results. Because key-man prosecution uses market forces to achieve
crime control (without a fence, there is no demand market for the thief;
without the cocaine, there is no supply market for the street-level
narcotics dealer), it would no longer be necessary to spend millions of
dollars prosecuting and incarcerating lower-level criminals. At the same
time, some areas of crime, such as gun offenses not related to illegal
interstate sales, could be left to the states.
Finally, there is a fairness achieved through employment of this
principle in a centralized way. The lottery aspect of federal criminal law,
based on what jurisdiction a defendant is in and which prosecutor is
assigned a given case, would decline. Simultaneously, and indirectly,
this would eliminate or deemphasize some current practices that have
subjected the DOJ to harsh criticism, such as the disproportionate
treatment of crack cocaine relative to powder cocaine.164
2.

Drawbacks

The two groups that would lose power under the key-man regime
described here are Congress and local federal prosecutors. There is no
doubt that many congressmen would chafe at the fact that some federal
laws were being enforced with less vigor, but they would be relatively
powerless to change the choices made by the Attorney General. U.S.
Attorneys and their Assistants, similarly, would be subject to more
binding direction and would be allowed less freedom to employ
prosecutorial discretion. Therefore, they could be expected to object to
this loss of power.
States may object to such a reapportionment of responsibility, as
well, given that it would be expected to, at least temporarily, raise the
caseloads of state prosecutors. In the longer term, of course, success in
crime control would be to the ultimate advantage of the state.
Obviously, the key-man system would work best in top-down rather
than bottom-up investigations, and this might take some changes to the
prevailing culture of investigation. That is, it would be most efficient to
target the key man directly, rather than relying on the cooperation of a
number of underlings seeking plea deals. This would require the
cultivation of new tactics.
For example, rather than testimony,
Because crack cocaine is formulated by street level dealers out of powder cocaine, it is
unlikely that those holding small amounts of crack cocaine would be considered “key
men.”

164
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investigators may be better off emphasizing wiretaps to capture the
conversations of key men, a technique that has the added advantage of
being more reliable. Federal officials could also use their heightened
access to intelligence information to reverse the process and start by
investigating those at the top of the pyramid, for example by examining
international financial transaction data.
Finally, commitment to key-man prosecution would represent a
political risk. The articulation of a principled goal and the ready ability
to measure success also means that the goal can be attacked and failures
will be apparent.
The fact there is a risk, however, is not a reason to avoid action. In
the end, we remember and revere the bold. In this time of tumult,165 the
field of sentencing calls out for an expression of principle from a source
chosen by the President to represent us all: the Attorney General of the
United States.

165

See supra Part I.A.
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